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INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank) has been stretching the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission’s resources dangerously thin—to the extent
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that the securities rule-maker has had to abandon some pressing
matters (filling crucial job openings) to address others
(promulgating 105 rules, conducting more than twenty studies, and
1
creating five new offices). Common sense dictates that in a time of
financial crisis, the last thing the government would want to do is
undercapitalize and overburden one of its financial watch-dog
agencies. Recent invalidations of Commission rules show that this is
indeed what Dodd-Frank has exacerbated, demonstrating that the
2
agency needs to refocus.
3
In a recent invalidation, Business Roundtable v. SEC, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
invalidated Rule 14a-11, which would have required public
companies to publish certain shareholders’ director nominations in
4
proxy statements. A proxy statement is a required statement filed in
advance of the annual meeting when a U.S. company solicits
5
shareholder votes. The purpose of a proxy statement is to “promote
‘the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders’ by ensuring
that proxies would be solicited with ‘explanation to the stockholder
of the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote
6
is sought.’” Although the Commission could have appealed the D.C.
Circuit’s decision, the Commission formally announced on
7
September 7, 2011, that it would not seek immediate review. The
8
court’s tabling of the constitutional issues raised in Business
1. See Bill Swindell, SEC Stretched Thin by New Rules, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1010/101910cdpm3.htm (quoting Chairman
Schapiro as indicating that the Commission had to “shift[] resources from other
areas that . . . are equally deserving of [the Commission’s] time and attention” and
that the Commission overall was “really resource constrained” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
2. See Diane Katz, Proxy Access Rule: Appeals Court Rejects SEC Regulation, THE
HERITAGE FOUND. (July 26, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/
07/proxy-access-rule-appeals-court-rejects-sec-regulation#_edn2 (recounting that
courts have recently invalidated at least three other Commission rules because the
Commission failed to adequately analyze the costs and benefits of the rules’
implementation).
3. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
4. Id. at 1147.
5. Proxy Statement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
proxy.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
6. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
73-1383, at 14 (1934); S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 12 (1934)).
7. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary
L. Schapiro on Proxy Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2011/2011-179.htm (explaining that the Commission will “‘learn from
the Court’s objections,’” indicating that the Commission took the court’s harsh
criticisms as final and would not seek review).
8. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156 (declaring that the Commission acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and noting that, “[a]ccordingly, [the court had] no
occasion to address the petitioners’ First Amendment challenge to the rule”).
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Roundtable puts the Commission in an uncomfortable position: the
Commission can start over and craft a new 14a-11-type rule that
accounts for a cost-benefit analysis, but those efforts may ultimately
be struck down based on a First Amendment challenge. The D.C.
Circuit lambasted the Commission for failing—yet again—to
9
adequately analyze the cost-benefit analysis of a proposed rule; but
solving the cost-benefit problem would not necessarily mean that the
rest of the Commission’s reasoning was sound. This dilemma could
cost the Commission—and the average American taxpayer—
10
significant amounts of money and time.
This Note argues that had the D.C. Circuit reached the First
Amendment issue in its analysis, the Commission would have learned
that any such mandatory proxy access rule will not withstand strict
scrutiny.
In particular, this Note contends that even if the
Commission can provide economic support for a new version of Rule
11
14a-11, so long as the rule requires mandatory proxy access, the rule
would be subject to strict scrutiny and thus would fail that review
because the Commission would be unable to show a compelling
interest or narrow tailoring. Part I provides the context surrounding
Rule 14a-11 and briefly explains the corporate First Amendment
jurisprudence under which any new version of the rule would be
analyzed. Part II discusses the First Amendment implications of Rule
14a-11’s possible successor and argues that any subsequent Rule 14a11 attempts will fail under the strict scrutiny analysis that would be
applied.
This Note concludes by recommending that the
Commission not waste its resources on replacing Rule 14a-11 because
the successor rule would fail strict scrutiny and be declared
unconstitutional.

Petitioners argued that requiring publication of a shareholder’s director
nominations violates a corporation’s First Amendment rights. Opening Brief of
Petitioners at 55, Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014800, at
*55.
9. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49 (blaming the Commission for
“opportunistically” characterizing certain costs and failing to address other costs
without explanation).
10. See Noam Noked, Implications of the Proxy Access Case, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Aug. 23, 2011, 9:15
AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/08/23/implications-of-the-proxyaccess-case/#more-20347 (positing that any further universal access rulemaking “will
have to be accompanied by substantial economic analysis that may be beyond the
resources that the agency can reasonably expend on any one rulemaking”).
11. Throughout this Note, all references to a “Rule 14a-11-type rule,” “Rule 14a11 successor,” or the like assume a rule that still requires universal mandatory proxy
access with no out, but has been properly analyzed and supported by the
Commission under the required cost-benefit analysis.

PARKER.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

718
I.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 8:04 PM

[Vol. 61:715

BACKGROUND: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION
AND A HISTORY OF RULE 14a-11

The Commission passed Rule 14a-11 in a 3-2 decision in August
2010 after an arduous fourteen months of deliberation and sifting
12
Had it been
through over 500 sharply-divided comment letters.
enacted without challenge, Rule 14a-11 would have allowed an
individual shareholder, or group of shareholders, to include a
nominee of the shareholder’s choice in a public company’s proxy
13
statement in certain instances. A Shareholder could file a Schedule
14
14N and provide a copy of their nomination to the company if the
shareholder owned at least three percent of the voting power entitled
to vote in the election of directors, had held that power for at least
three years, and intended to continue to own these securities through
15
the upcoming director election.
Business Roundtable, an
association comprised of chief executive officers of leading U.S.
companies, challenged the implementation of Rule 14a-11; the
Commission temporarily stayed the use of Rule 14a-11 and its sister
16
rule, Rule 14a-8.
Under the amendments to Rule 14a-8, public companies would no
longer be able to exclude a shareholder’s proposal to establish a rule
in a company’s governing documents guaranteeing inclusion of one
17
or more shareholders’ director nominations in the proxy statement.
Rule 14a-8 would thus allow shareholders to accomplish
independently what Rule 14a-11 would require of companies: to
include certain shareholders’ director nominations in proxy
18
materials.
12. Jeffrey McCracken & Kara Scannell, Fight Brews as Proxy-Access Nears:
Companies Race to Derail or Soften SEC Plan; ‘Ultimate Vehicle’ for Activists, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 26, 2009, at C1.
13. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674 (Sept. 16, 2010).
14. A Schedule 14N is a document submitted to the SEC disclosing, among other
things, information surrounding the length of ownership and the shareholder’s
voting power.
15. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,674–77
(summarizing how a shareholder could invoke Rule 14a-11).
16. In re Bus. Roundtable, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act Release
No. 63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010 WL 3862548 (Oct. 4,
2010) (granting stay). The rules had been scheduled to become effective November
15, 2010. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9151, Exchange Act Release No. 63,109, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,462, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,641, 64,641 (Oct. 20, 2010).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
18. Compare Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at
56,674–77 (summarizing the amendments to Rule 14a-11 that would compel all
public companies to publish the director nominations of certain shareholder), with
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In Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit struck down Rule 14a-11 on
19
procedural grounds, but the court left Plaintiffs’ constitutional
20
challenges untouched. The D.C. Circuit declared the rule invalid
on the grounds that the Commission acted “arbitrarily and
21
capriciously” by failing to assess the economic effects of Rule 14a-11.
However, Rule 14a-11 also implicates the First Amendment because
corporations are legal persons that retain rights under the
22
Constitution just as citizens do. Plaintiffs asserted that Rule 14a-11
violated the First Amendment by compelling companies to publish
third-party speech by including shareholder nominations in proxy
23
materials.
Plaintiffs further argued that companies could be
required to do so even when a majority of shareholders oppose the
nomination and even if the accompanying speech was false or
24
misleading.
Under the First Amendment, groups and individuals usually are
25
not required to speak or to carry the speech of a third party. In
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (prohibiting corporations from excluding shareholder
proposals to include bylaws that would require the company to publish shareholder
proxy nominations).
19. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
20. Id. at 1156.
21. Id. at 1148–49. The court elaborated that the “arbitrary and capricious”
conclusion was based on the Commission’s unjustified rosy outlook on the costs and
benefits of the rule, its failure to quantify costs, its failure to support predictive
judgments, and the inclusion of contradictory statements in the Rule. Id. The D.C.
Circuit also strongly criticized the Commission’s application of the rule to investment
companies, id. at 1154–56, but that issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
22. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 706 (1819)
(establishing the notion of corporate personhood in the United States); see also 1
U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, . . . as well as
individuals.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“The Court has
recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations.” (citations
omitted)).
23. Opening Brief of Petitioners at 55, Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 101305), 2011 WL 2014800, at *55.
24. Id. at 56. Under Rule 14a-11, companies would be required to publish
information about, and the ability to vote for, a shareholder’s nominees for director.
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136,
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674–77 (Sept. 16, 2010). The final rule makes clear that a
shareholder will be liable for any false or misleading representations made in the
Schedule 14N, but it does not prevent the possibility that the company could publish
and circulate the materials before the false or misleading nature of the facts
surrounding the director nomination becomes known. Id. at 56,676.
25. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241–42 (1977)
(forbidding teachers’ union from using service charges required by non-union
members to publish ideological views of the union); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 714 (1977) (holding that police could not prevent citizens from covering a
portion of the state license plate reading “Live Free or Die” because the First
Amendment afforded the individuals the right to hold an opinion different from the
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Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission, the Supreme Court
invalidated a state law requiring a gas and electric utility to carry the
27
message of a third party on a newsletter sent to customers. Pacific
Gas inserted a newsletter in its monthly bill to customers that
28
included, among other subjects, political editorials. After a public
consumer group requested that the Public Utilities Commission
forbid distribution of editorials through the newsletter, the Utilities
Commission instead required Pacific Gas to apportion space in its
newsletter for use by the public consumer group four times a year,
29
despite the group’s views being contrary to those of Pacific Gas. The
third-party “[a]ccess” to the billing envelope was “limited to persons
or groups . . . who disagree[d] with [the utility’s] views . . . and who
30
oppose[d] [the utility] in” certain proceedings before the agency.
The plurality applied strict scrutiny and determined that the agency’s
requirement of newsletter space for third parties burdened the
utility’s “right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its
31
own rights in order to ‘enhance the relative voice’ of its opponents.”
The Court ultimately declared the order invalid because it infringed
on Pacific Gas’s freedom of speech by compelling the company to
32
provide a forum for views in opposition to its own.
Content-based speech regulation requires courts to apply strict
scrutiny—the most stringent standard of judicial review—to assess the
33
constitutionality of a law. For a government action to pass strict
scrutiny, it must: (1) be justified by a compelling interest; (2) be
narrowly tailored; and (3) be the least restrictive means for achieving
34
the asserted goal.
Courts have been reluctant to define what
constitutes a compelling interest, but the concept generally applies to
35
something necessary or crucial, not merely preferred.
To be
majority).
26. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
27. Id. at 6–7.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 20–21.
33. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 462 (2009)
(“[C]ontent-based restrictions must satisfy strict scrutiny, i.e., they must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”); see also Gabriel A. Feldman,
The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U.
L. REV. 561, 592 (2009) (describing the method of review of an infringement of a
fundamental right as “a maximizing test”).
34. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 817 (2000).
35. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172 (2001) (characterizing admissions
of guilt from valid Miranda waivers as not merely “‘desirable,’” but essential to serving
society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing criminals); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999 (1996) (“The simple question is whether the race-based
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narrowly tailored, an action may not be overbroad or fail to address
37
specific indispensable facets of the compelling interest.
II. A RULE COMPELLING PUBLICATION OF SHAREHOLDER PROXY
NOMINATIONS VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF CORPORATIONS
Even if the Commission creates a new 14a-11-like rule adjusted to
38
comply with the procedural defects identified in Business Roundtable,
the new rule would violate the First Amendment. Any rule that
compels a public company to print and circulate shareholder
nominations should be subject to strict scrutiny, and such a rule will
necessarily fail that test because it would not serve a compelling
interest, would not be narrowly tailored, and would not be the least
39
restrictive means available for achieving the government’s interest.
A. Strict Scrutiny Applies Because Rule 14a-11 is a Content-Based
Regulation of Corporate Speech
Any regulation of the content of speech made by persons,
individual or corporate, is subject to strict scrutiny if it is not based on
40
reasonable time, place, and manner concerns.
Rule 14a-11
regulates the content of speech because it compels companies to
carry and fund third-party speech with which the companies
41
disagree. Creation of a rule aiming to increase proxy access that did
not have universal scope would be redundant because shareholders

districting was reasonably necessary to serve a compelling interest.” (emphasis
added)).
36. See Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(invalidating a law requiring a permit to engage in “expressive” activity in a national
park because it was “overbroad” and therefore violated the First Amendment). The
overbreadth in Boardley derived from a regulation prohibiting the speech of a single
pamphleteer in a “free speech area”: an area where the government had little
interest in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere. Id. at 520–21.
37. See Maurice R. Dyson, When Government Is a Passive Participant in Private
Discrimination: A Critical Look at White Privilege & the Tacit Return to Interposition in Pics
v. Seattle School District, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 150 (2008) (defining as “underinclusive” those laws that do not meet the requirements of strict scrutiny because
they fail to address essential aspects of the compelling interest).
38. 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
39. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 813, 817 (defining the elements of strict
scrutiny that an alternative Rule 14a-11 would have to satisfy).
40. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (holding that
content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny, while contentneutral regulations are only subject to intermediate scrutiny).
41. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986)
(applying strict scrutiny to orders trying to compel companies to publish third-party
information). Additionally, if enacted, Rule 14a-11 could mandate the publication of
speech that is false and misleading. See Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 23,
at 55.
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already have the ability to implement mandatory proxy access at their
discretion.
Strict scrutiny applies to content-based regulations of speech,
except in rare circumstances that involve lesser-protected categories,
42
such as commercial speech.
Rule 14a-11 does not implicate
commercial speech, which has been defined as “advertisements that
43
‘[do] no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”
Commercial speech is often reviewed by reference to the audience,
rather than the speaker, and has been protected when the audience
44
consists of consumers entitled to know the “truth” from companies.
Rule 14a-11’s replacement rule would not be directed at consumers,
45
but rather at shareholders. Rule 14a-11’s replacement, therefore,
would not be commercial speech and thus would not be subject to a
lower standard of review.
Similarly, the idea that the “comprehensive regulation of . . .
securities” subjects speech about corporate governance to less First
Amendment protection is not sufficient to exempt the Rule from
46
strict scrutiny.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the
47
Commission’s regulation of speech concerning securities, courts
have delineated that only “[s]peech relating to the purchase and
48
sale of securities” is subject to lesser First Amendment scrutiny. Rule
42. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001) (“We
have used standards for determining the validity of speech regulations which accord
less protection to commercial speech than to other expression.”).
43. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 790 (1985)
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)); see also United Foods, 533 U.S. at 409 (noting that commercial
speech occurs when one “propose[s] a commercial transaction”).
44. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 567–
68 (1980) (holding that corporations have the right to propose commercial
transactions and advertise because consumers have the right to the information, not
because of corporate personhood); see also Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and
the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 868 (2007) (explaining that,
in commercial speech cases, the “identity of the speaker [is] more or less ignored”).
45. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674–77 (Sept. 16, 2010) (summarizing the
Commission’s finalized rule).
46. See SEC v. Wall Street Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (noting that the First Amendment does not limit regulation in “areas of
extensive economic supervision, such as the securities, antitrust and transportation
fields” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Commission
argued that, because the rule purports to regulate securities, it should be subjected
to a less stringent First Amendment analysis than strict scrutiny. Brief for
Respondent at 64–65, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014799, at *64–65.
47. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 758 n.5 (explaining that the
government is permitted to regulate securities and corporate proxy statements, as
well as commercial speech).
48. See Wall Street, 851 F.2d at 373 (noting that the government’s authority to
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14a-11, however, did not address the purchase and sale of securities.
Rather, the rule addressed shareholder proxy access. Accordingly, it
was not within the scope of the Commission’s authority to regulate
49
speech. The proxy access rule would regulate the content of the
information disseminated, rather than merely ensuring dissemination
of information to ordinary citizens, which is the Commission’s
50
primary function and reason for creation. The D.C. Circuit has
stated that it would be “impermissibl[e]” for the Commission to “be
51
drawn into the arena encompassing content regulation” of speech.
Rule 14a-11 does not simply require additional disclosure from the
company; it forces the company to publish a third party’s view. One
could argue that because the shareholders own a stake in the
company, they are associated with the company and are not third
parties. Although the shareholders own the corporation’s securities,
52
they do not own the corporation.
This is a subtle but essential
53
difference. Because the corporation itself is a legal entity, and
because a shareholder is not authorized to act on behalf of the
54
corporation, it follows that the shareholder and the company are
not the same person within the eyes of the law. Consequently, the
speech of a shareholder is not the same as the speech of a
55
corporation, and shareholder speech is therefore third-party speech.
regulate speech pertaining to the purchase and sale of securities is “at least as broad”
as its authority to regulate commercial speech).
49. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,723
(mentioning selling and purchasing of securities only with regards to reporting
requirements of section 5(b) of schedule 14A).
50. The Commission strives to provide “all investors, whether large institutions or
private individuals, [with] access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to
buying it.” The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). The Commission was created after the
Great Crash of 1929, when it was estimated that over half of the securities sold to
people were fraudulent. Id. The Commission was created to “restore investor
confidence in . . . capital markets by providing investors and the markets with more
reliable information and clear rules of honest dealing.” Id.
51. Wall Street, 851 F.2d at 375.
52. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L.
965, 1007 (2009) (noting that securities give shareholders rights to the profits and
assets of the company, but not to the company itself).
53. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate
Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767,
773–74 (2005) (asserting that the notion of the corporation as a legal person dates
back to the Roman empire).
54. See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L.
377, 438 (2004) (noting that, unlike partnerships, shareholders “are not agents of
the corporation,” “cannot cause the corporation to incur liabilities,” and “are not
liable for the debts of their corporation”).
55. Cf. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302–
04 (2011) (holding that a mutual fund can “make” a statement independently of its
shareholders or directors).
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B. Rule 14a-11 Does Not Serve a Compelling Interest
To survive strict scrutiny, the rule must serve a compelling
56
interest. A compelling interest is one that is crucial or necessary,
57
not just preferable.
A Rule 14a-11-type requirement, however,
would guarantee mandatory proxy access, which is not necessary, and
58
some argue is not even desirable.
In its final brief to the D.C.
Circuit, the Commission described its “substantial interest in assuring
that the federally regulated proxy process more closely approximates
the in-person shareholders’ meeting by facilitating shareholders’
exercise of their state-law rights to nominate and elect members of
59
the board.” The Commission’s brief, however, made no mention of
60
61
a “compelling interest.” “Compelling interest” is a term of art, and
by failing to categorize its interest as the type necessary under strict
scrutiny, the Commission hurt its constitutional argument.
Additionally, the Commission cannot have a compelling interest in
a 14a-11-type rule because forcing a company to associate with the
views of third parties violates a basic principle that legal persons
cannot “be an instrument for fostering . . . an ideological point of
62
view” they find “unacceptable.”
Additionally, such a rule would
conflict with Supreme Court decisions rejecting the “mandated
63
support” of “speech by others” by forcing companies to publish
speech that potentially conflicts with their views.
Moreover, an order that is not content-neutral would not further
the government interest of promoting speech by making a variety of
64
viewpoints available.
A 14a-11-type rule could not serve a
56. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 817 (2000)
(applying strict scrutiny to laws that merely burden speech in the same manner as to
those that completely restrict speech).
57. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (examining cases where courts have
defined a “compelling interest” as something necessary or crucial).
58. See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich, D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Proxy Access Rules,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION (July 22, 2011, 4:36 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2011/07/22/d-c-circuit-strikes-down-proxy-access-rules/ (arguing that proxy access is
not only unnecessary, but indeed is not even helpful).
59. Brief for Respondent, supra note 46, at 67.
60. See id. at 66–67.
61. Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal Sacrifice and
Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 n.81 (1996).
62. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (invalidating the
requirement that New Hampshire residents could not cover “Live Free or Die” on
their license plates).
63. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001).
64. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986)
(providing that inhibiting one side’s expression at the expense of another means the
content is not neutral); see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
530, 536 (1980) (declaring that, when the government regulates speech based on its
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compelling interest because it is not neutral in “exposing” individuals
65
“to a variety of viewpoints.” Similar to the requirement invalidated
in Pacific Gas, where a state utilities commission ordered the utility
66
company to place a third party’s newsletter in its billing envelopes,
Rule 14a-11 attempted to require companies to place the information
supporting director nominations of third parties in proxy statements
67
to shareholders.
The mandated enclosure was not “neutral” in
either instance because each disclosure necessarily entailed
publishing opinions of persons “who disagree with [the company’s]
68
views as expressed.”
Had the D.C. Circuit addressed the
constitutional issue in Business Roundtable, like the requirement in
Pacific Gas, the court would likely have found Rule 14a-11
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny—as the court would any
replacement for this rule.
C. Rule 14a-11 is Not Narrowly Tailored or Less Restrictive Than
Alternative Means
Any subsequent 14a-11-type rule would not be narrowly tailored
because less restrictive means exist for achieving the government’s
69
purpose.
The original rule is not narrowly tailored because it
70
necessarily includes all public corporations in its scope. Previously
proposed proxy access rule amendments, for example, required
certain “triggers” that may have demonstrated an objective need for
subject matter, the regulation “slips from . . . neutrality . . . into a concern about
content,” and is more likely to be unconstitutional (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
65. Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 20.
66. Id. at 5–7.
67. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674–77 (Sept. 16, 2010).
68. Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 13.
69. E.g., Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1183 (9th Cir.
2007) (determining that the definition of “contribution” was narrowly tailored
because it “(1) promote[d] a substantial government interest that would be achieved
less effectively absent the regulation, and (2) [did] not burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Human
Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010); Fraternal Order of
Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 599 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a statute
excluding professional solicitors from an exemption of charitable organizations
being blocked on do-not-call lists was narrowly tailored because it applied only to
unwilling residents); Int’l Caucus of Labor Comms. v. City of Montgomery, 111 F.3d
1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1997) (determining that a ban on distributing political
literature from tables on sidewalks was narrowly tailored to fit the municipality’s
interest in keeping public pathways obstruction free).
70. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,679–80
(explaining the reasoning behind, and consequences of, including a no “opt out”
provision in the Commission’s final rule).
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71

increased proxy access.
In contrast, Rule 14a-11 applies to all
companies—except those that have debt securities registered under
Section 12 of the Exchange Act—and does not allow companies to
72
opt out of Rule 14a-11’s requirements.
Other less restrictive possibilities exist to achieve the government’s
interest of increasing proxy access. One such example would be for
73
the Commission to rely on the amendment to Rule 14a-8.
The
amendment changes Rule 14a-8(i) so that companies may no longer
rely on Rule 14a-8(i) to exclude a shareholder proposal to establish a
procedure in the governing documents guaranteeing proxy access for
74
one or more shareholders.
This technique still satisfies the
Commission’s overall goal—to have increased shareholder proxy
access—but only imposes it on corporations where shareholders elect
75
to utilize such a rule. Because the Commission is concerned about
shareholders having sufficient proxy access, the Commission should
implement a mechanism to ensure that shareholders can propose
and adopt a bylaw that would require companies to publish
76
shareholder proxy materials.
71. Compare Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No.
48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,789–92
(proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (triggering events include (1) a majority of outstanding
shares authorizes requiring shareholder nominations to be published with proxy
materials, and (2) shareholders representing at least thirty-five percent of the votes
withhold authority on their proxy cards for their shares to be voted for a director),
with Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,680–81
(defending the decision not to include triggering events based on the concern that
inclusion would add unnecessary complexity and impede shareholders’ abilities to
nominate and elect directors in all companies, not just those with demonstrated
governance issues). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC’s Shareholder
Access Proposal, ENGAGE, Apr. 2004, at 18, 24 (positing that the presence of triggering
events would still not narrowly tailor a proposed rule because “nothing in either [of
the SEC’s proposed] trigger[s] limits the rule to the Enrons of the world”).
72. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,671–74
(explaining that, despite the split in comments suggesting that a “one size fits all”
approach will not work, the Commission decided not to allow companies to exempt
themselves from Rule 14a-11 regulation).
73. See id. at 56,730 (detailing the proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8).
74. Id. at 56,731–32.
75. See id. at 56,677–80 (indicating that the changes are intended to “facilitate
the effective exercise of shareholders’ traditional State law rights to nominate and
elect directors to company boards of directors”).
76. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (describing when a company must include
shareholder proposals in the company’s proxy statements); see also Robert J. Jackson,
Jr., SEC Strengthens Shareholders’ Role in Corporate Political Speech Decisions, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 15,
2011,
11:04
AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/05/15/secstrengthens-shareholders’-role-in-corporate-political-speech-decisions/ (advocating
to increase shareholder power over the board to include things such as veto power
over political campaign contribution decisions). But see Charles M. Nathan, A 12-Step
Program to Truly Good Corporate Governance, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 18, 2011, 9:26 AM),
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Rule 14a-8 provides this mechanism by allowing shareholders to
propose mandatory proxy access provisions for the company in which
77
they hold stock. Rule 14a-11, conversely, forces mandatory proxy
78
access on all companies without providing an out. This is inapposite
with a principal tenet of business law: shareholders should not be
79
coerced into adopting provisions. Consequently, a new 14a-11-type
rule would not be narrowly tailored because it would encompass all
public companies without providing an out, would not be targeted at
only those companies in need of increased proxy access, and would
not be the least restrictive means available to the Commission to
achieve its desired goals.
CONCLUSION
Due to Dodd-Frank, the Commission will continue to be
exceptionally busy for the foreseeable future, stretching its already
80
thin resources to the breaking point. During a time when there is so
81
much else to do, the Commission should not waste time and
resources by pursuing a recalibration of Rule 14a-11. Any mandatory
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/05/18/a-12-step-program-to-trulygood-corporate-governance/ (arguing that expanded shareholder access reduces
economic value to the average shareholder by allowing corporate governance and
social accountability activists to distract board members from their true objective of
maximizing shareholder wealth).
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (explaining how a shareholder can include a
proposal in a company’s proxy card and listing circumstances where the company
may exclude the shareholder’s proposal).
78. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,679–80.
79. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387–88 (Del. 1995)
(invalidating anti-takeover measures because they are “preclusive” and “coercive”
with regards to shareholders).
80. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting that the Commission has
been forced to devote too many resources to complying with Dodd-Frank).
81. For instance, the SEC is working on developing the rules to get a
consolidated audit trail (CAT) system in place that will collect equity stock trading
information in real time. This will be more efficient by allowing for SEC staff
members previously encumbered by bluesheeting (the process of collecting equity
stock trading information) to spend more time analyzing the data than collecting it.
See Scott Patterson, SEC Pushes Plan for Audit System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904491704576574883908453622.h
tml. Additionally, the SEC has recently come under fire for settling too quickly and
for too little with companies thought to have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.
See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387, 2011 WL 5903733, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011) (rejecting SEC proposed settlement with Citigroup because
recent SEC policy of settling cases without requiring the accused company to either
admit or deny the agency’s allegations does not satisfy the law). It has been
suggested that the lighter stance taken against some of the biggest firms involved
with the financial meltdown has been due to an agency stretched too thin and
lacking the necessary capacities to fight against the Goliath corporations. See Times
Topics: Securities and Exchange Commission, NYTIMES.COM, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/securities_and_exchange_commission/i
ndex.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
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proxy access rule will necessarily fail strict scrutiny, which must be
applied because such a rule would regulate the content of
corporations’ speech. Because a mandatory proxy access rule does
not serve a compelling government interest, is not narrowly tailored,
and is not the least restrictive means for achieving that interest, a
recalibration of Rule 14a-11—even if able to overcome the
procedural defects outlined by the court in Business Roundtable v.
SEC—will still fail strict scrutiny. The mandates of Dodd-Frank
already require tremendous resources from the Commission.
Because of the obstacles it faces, the Commission should abandon a
mandatory proxy access rule and focus its attention on other projects
and problems, such as upgrading market surveillance technology and
remaining tough on rule-breakers.

